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ABSTRACT

The circuit courts are split as to how a plan administrator of an
ERISA-governed employee benefit plan must notify a claimant of a time
limitation placed on a claimant’s ability to seek judicial review of an
adverse benefit decision. Some courts indicate that inclusion of this time
limitation in the Summary Plan Description is sufficient to notify a
claimant. Other courts have held that the time period must specifically be
included in adverse determination notices, which are documents notifying
claimants of the denial of their claim and the right to judicial review.
Much of the debate among courts concerns the requirement of 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) that a benefits determination include a
“description of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits
applicable to such procedures.”
In this Article, I argue that the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(g)(1)(iv) is clear: the Plan-provided limitations period must be included
in a final adverse benefits determination notice. Failure to disclose this
information cannot be said to be in strict—or even substantial—
compliance with the statute because such a failure would burden a
claimant with no way to adequately remedy this burden. While claimants
who have actual knowledge of the time limitation should be subject to the
Plan’s period of limitation even if it was not contained in the benefits
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determination, a claimant that has simply received a Summary Plan
Description should not be said to have constructive knowledge of the
limitation period. The courts should treat a failure to disclose a limitation
period in an adverse benefits determination notice as a waiver of the time
limitation described in the Plan and instead apply an analogous state law
statute of limitations, instead of tolling the limitations period set forth by
the noncompliant Plan.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
regulates employee welfare benefit plans. 1 Since the law’s enactment,
questions have been raised regarding the appropriate application of certain
statutory provisions. This Article will consider the language contained in
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) and analyze the following issues: 1)
when and how an ERISA governed welfare benefit plan (Plan) must
provide claimants notice of the Plan’s contractual limitations period for
judicial review, and 2) when and how a claimant may seek judicial review
if inadequate or no such notice is provided. There is considerable
disagreement as to the interpretation of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), which
provides that the adverse benefit determination must include: “A
description of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits applicable
to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s right to bring
a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following an adverse benefit
determination on review.” 2
The First, Third, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have recently
held that an employer or Plan Administrator is in violation of the
regulatory obligation if it fails to provide notice of the limitations period
for review, regardless of the claimant’s actual knowledge of the
limitations period.3 Furthermore, these courts held that if no such notice
is provided to claimants in the denial of benefits notice, then the
limitations period under the Plan will be waived and replaced with the
limitations period provided by the most closely analogous state law claim,

* Student at The University of Akron School of Law pursing a joint Juris Doctorate and Master of
Taxation. Anticipated graduation in December 2018. Managing Editor (2017-2018) of ConLawNOW,
an online journal of the Akron Law Review.
1. While many of the ERISA claim requirements apply to both welfare and pension plans,
this Article will deal exclusively with welfare plans.
2. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) (2018).
3. Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2015); Santana-Díaz v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 816 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2016); Moyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.
2014).
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as opposed to equitably tolling 4 the Plan’s contractual limitations period. 5
Disparately, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have not
interpreted § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to require the contractual limitations
period disclosure in the denial notice. 6 These circuits held that such
limitations period notice is irrelevant if the claimant had actual notice of
the limitations period, which may be imputed to the claimant by the
receipt of a Summary Plan Description (SPD) or copy of the Plan
Document. 7 In some cases, equitable tolling would be justified if the
claimant had no actual knowledge of the limitations period and exercised
diligence in pursuing his or her claim or was prevented from doing so by
extraordinary circumstances. 8
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life
& Accident Insurance Co. (Heimeshoff (2013)) addressed the
reasonableness of the Plan’s contractual limitations periods, but it did not
address other issues in these circuit split cases. 9 In light of the circuit split,
this Article will explore the arguments on both sides of the issue and argue
that the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits’ arguments should govern because
ERISA is clear on its face that notice of limitations is required in every
adverse benefit determination. Furthermore, imputing the claimant with
knowledge of the limitations period based upon receipt of the SPD is
unfair to the claimant in cases where notice was provided out of context
or buried in massive, esoteric Plan Documents. Finally, barring claimants
4. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “equitable tolling” as:
The doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite
diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired,
in which case the statute is suspended or tolled until the plaintiff discovers the injury. . . .
A court’s discretionary extension of a legal deadline as a result of extraordinary circumstances that prevented one from complying despite reasonable diligence throughout the
period before the deadline passed.
Equitable Tolling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). I discuss the concept of equitable
tolling as it relates to benefits claims further supra in Sections III and IV(D).
5. Mirza, 800 F.3d at 137; Santana-Díaz, 816 F.3d at 172.
6. Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2015); Scharff v. Raytheon Co.
Short Term Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2009); Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 496 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
7. The Plan Document describes the Plan’s administration process, types of benefits provided,
and other required information. The Summary Plan Description (SPD) is an abbreviated summary of
the Plan Document that must be provided to participants and must be written in a manner that is easily
understood by the recipient. Certain information must be provided in the SPD, including the Plan
name, contact information, eligibility requirements, and, of particular relevance to this Article, “[t]he
procedures governing claims for benefits . . . , applicable time limits, and remedies available under
the plan for the redress of claims which are denied in whole or in part . . . .” 29 C.F.R § 2520.1023(s) (2018) (emphasis added).
8. Wilson, 613 F. App’x at 841; Heimeshoff, 496 F. App’x at 130-31.
9. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 610 (2013).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/8

4

Smith: For Whom the Bell (Equitably) Tolls

2017]

FOR WHOM THE BELL (EQUITABLY) TOLLS

1233

from bringing claims after the Plan’s contractual limitations period has
run when the claimant was not provided the statutorily-required notice
encourages Plans’ noncompliance with ERISA.
Section II of this Article will explore the background of ERISA,
providing context for § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv). This section will also
provide a review of the claims procedure process and the particular terms
of art relevant to the process as used by courts, legislatures, and
practitioners. This information provides clarifying background necessary
to supporting the conclusions set forth in Section IV.
Section III summarizes the courts’ findings in prominent cases
demonstrating the circuit split. The cases are reviewed and compared
against one another, providing insight into the reasons for the circuit
courts’ conclusions. As Section III shows, even in cases with similar facts,
the circuit courts reach different remedies for insufficient adverse
determination notices.
Section IV analyzes the tools that the circuit courts used in reaching
their interpretations of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) and concludes that if a
claimant’s denial notice does not contain the statutorily-required notice,
the Plan’s contractual limitations period should be set aside, instead
applying the limitations period of the most closely analogous state cause
of action.
II. ERISA AND THE CLAIMS PROCESS
ERISA is the federal law that governs most private-sector employee
benefit Plans that are voluntarily established and maintained by an
employer or employee organization. 10 ERISA does not apply to all Plans,
generally excluding government Plans, church Plans, and “plans which
are maintained solely to comply with workers’ compensation,
unemployment, or disability laws.” 11 ERISA § 1001(b) indicates that the
Act is intended to protect:
[T]he interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto,
by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate

10. Coverage, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
11. Health Benefits, Retirement Standards, and Workers’ Compensation: Employee Benefit
Plans, DEP’T OF LABOR (updated Dec. 2016), https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/erisa.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ZHJ-5G2R]; Coverage, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b).
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remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts. 12

ERISA was enacted to provide uniformity of rules application and
protection to employees or former employees who are or will become
eligible to receive benefits under a Plan (Participants).13 This goal is not
achieved when circuit courts inconsistently apply ERISA as discussed in
Section III.
A.

ERISA Broadly

ERISA covers two types of employee benefit plans: pension plans
(also referred to as retirement plans), and welfare benefit plans (also
known as health and welfare plans or group health plans, which typically
provide medical and/or dental benefits). 14 ERISA does not require
employers to provide employee benefits. 15 Once established, however,
ERISA sets forth rules that a plan must follow. Each plan must have a
Plan Sponsor and a Plan Administrator; often the employer fulfills both
roles. The Plan Administrator is directly responsible for compliance with
ERISA obligations and retains the legal liability for noncompliance. 16
ERISA plans must also name at least one fiduciary, either a person or an
entity, who directs the plan’s operation. 17 Others may act as fiduciaries
for the plan, though not expressly named in the plan, with the defining
factor being whether they exercise “discretion or control over the plan,”
including deciding participants’ eligibility for benefits and determinations
of claimants’ appeals. 18
Each plan must have a Plan Document, which describes the plan’s
administration process, types of benefits provided, and other important
information. Instead of distributing this often lengthy document to all
12. Congressional findings and declaration of policy, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b).
13. See
Health
Plans
&
Benefits:
ERISA,
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa [https://perma.cc/9464-V8XM] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2018); Definitions, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002 (1).
14. Id.; see also Glossary, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/
[https://perma.cc/NN3T-2N8K] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
15. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS, DARCY L. HITESMAN & NANCY A. STRELAU, EBIA BENEFITS
LIBRARY: ERISA COMPLIANCE FOR HEALTH & WELFARE PLANS 7 (Thomson Reuters Checkpoint,
3rd qtr. ed. 2016).
16. Id. (“For single-employer plans, the employer-sponsor is usually the plan administrator
because, unless someone else is designated in the documents governing a plan, ERISA provides that
the plan administrator is the plan sponsor.”).
17. Understanding Your Fiduciary Responsibilities Under a Group Health Plan, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/understanding-yourfiduciary-responsibilities-under-a-group-health-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D5P-F9JV].
18. Id.
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participants and beneficiaries, a SPD that summarizes the Plan Document
in a “manner understandable to the average plan participant” is required
to be prepared and distributed to all participant and beneficiaries.19 A SPD
“must not have the effect of misleading, misinforming, or failing to inform
participants and beneficiaries”; must explain any exceptions or other
restrictions of plan benefits; and may be enforced over the Plan
Document, if there is a discrepancy. 20 Additionally, and of particular
importance to this Article, the SPD must include information about the
plan’s internal claims procedures and external review procedures.21
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
“establishes a new section 2719 of the [Public Health Services Act
(PHSA)], which has been incorporated into ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code.” 22 This new section, 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719, adopts
the ERISA internal claims and appeals requirements found in 29 C.F.R. §
2560.5301-1. In 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Department of Treasury issued
interim final rules (IFR), which were later codified as 29 C.F.R. §
2590.715-2719 and became effective January 1, 2017. 23 IFR adopts the
requirements of § 2560.503-1 and adds additional requirements relating
to the internal and external benefits claim review. 24
B.

Enforcement of ERISA Through the EBSA

The DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) is
the “federal mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties” under
ERISA. 25 Noncompliance with ERISA requirements may result in “DOL
enforcement actions and penalty assessments or [through] employee
lawsuits” in state or federal court under § 502(a): 26

19. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 14-15.
20. Id. The SPD must be updated and distributed to all participants every five years, or if there
are no major changes, every ten years. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 16 (stating that the SPD must also contain, inter alia: basic plan information, such as
plan name, plan number, and the names of the plan sponsor and administrator; a description of the
plan’s eligibility rules; a description of the benefits the plan provides; “a statement clearly identifying
circumstances that may result in loss or denial of benefits”).
22. Memorandum from Jon Breyfogle and Julia Zuckerman, Groom Law Group, to Joel
Slackman, ACA Claims and Appeals Regulations (Sept. 9, 2010) at 2,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/publiccomments/1210-AB45/00076.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA3H-YBCP] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (2018).
24. Id.
25. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
26. Id. at 2-3.
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When deciding disputes under ERISA, federal court judges have the
power not only to interpret and apply ERISA to the facts but also to fill
gaps in ERISA through creation of ERISA “federal common law.”
ERISA compliance obligations, not otherwise found in the statute or
regulations, are increasingly being created by federal judges. 27

ERISA compliance obligations are also shaped by final regulations set
forth by EBSA. 28 Courts give great deference to these final regulations.29
The DOL has also issued non-binding interpretive bulletins, Advisory
Opinions, Information Letters, Technical Releases, Notices, FAQs, and
Field Assistance Bulletins. 30
C.

The Claims Procedure Overview

ERISA sets forth notification and reporting regulations that govern
the design and administration of retirement plans and welfare plans and
provides remedies by which participants may bring claims for violations
of these rules. 31 Except as specifically provided under the statute, every
plan governed by ERISA must establish and maintain claims procedures,
including the claims process and notification of claim determinations and
the appeals process. 32
There are two types of claims that can be brought under welfare
plans: group health plan claims and disability claims. 33 Group health plan
claims are claims for medical benefits, including emergency medical care
or treatment, ongoing treatment, and other medical care requiring
approval either before or after treatment. 34 Disability claims are similar to
group health plan claims but require the claimant to establish that he or

27. Id. at 34 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) and Sec. Life
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 1998)).
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 32-33.
31. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-129); see also 26 C.F.R § 54.4980F1 (WEST 2018) (effective Nov. 24, 2009).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a)(b) (2018); see generally Thomas G. Hancuch, Thomas G.
Moukawsher & Eunice Washington, Benefits Claims: A Primer on Claims Procedures and Benefit
Claims Litigation, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
ANNUAL CLE CONFERENCE (Sept. 10-13, 2008), 3, http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2008/ac2008/078.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XYF4-5Z57].
33. Hancuch et al., supra note 32, at 3-4.
34. Id. These group health claims may include urgent care claims, concurrent care claims, preservice care claims, and post-service care claims, respectively. Id.
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she is disabled, as defined by the plan, in order to get a benefit, such as
long-term disability benefits. 35
PHSA § 2719 addresses the internal claims, appeals, and external
review process of adverse benefit determinations. 36 Under the DOL’s
claims procedure regulation in 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, adverse benefit
determinations eligible for internal claims and appeals processes generally
include a reason for “[a] denial, reduction, termination, or failure to make
a payment based on the imposition of a preexisting condition exclusion, a
source of injury exclusion, or other limitation on covered benefits.” 37 With
the implementation of the PPACA, the definition of “adverse benefit
determination” has been broadened to include rescissions of coverage. 38
The specific benefits to which Participants are entitled are governed
by the Plan Document created by the employer, subject to the provisions
in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 39 Generally, the Plan Administrator or
insurance provider has the authority to approve or deny claims. In the
event that a claimant’s claim is denied, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 requires every
employee benefit Plan to provide the claimant with certain information. 40
First, the Plan must provide written notice of the denial, including specific
reasons for the denial “written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the participant.” 41 Second, the Plan must give a “reasonable
opportunity . . . for a full and fair review” of the denial (which is referred
to as an appeal). 42 The written notice is called a determination letter, a
determination notice, or, as used throughout this Article, an adverse
benefit determination. 43
Title 29 U.S.C. § 1133 tasks the Secretary of Labor with creating the
rules governing the claims procedure process. 44 In exercising that
authority, the DOL issued extensive regulations in 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-

35. Id. at 4.
36. Final Rules for Grandfathered Plans, Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and
Annual Limits, Rescissions, Dependent Coverage, Appeals, and Patient Protections Under the
Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 72191(II)(D)(4), 77204 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2712, 29 C.F.R. § 2590-2712, 45 C.F.R. § 147.128),
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-29294/p-139 [https://perma.cc/352E-VGHP] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2018).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hancuch et al., supra note 32, at 1.
40. Claims Procedure, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1133 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 134-36 (3d Cir. 2015) (referring to the
notice as an adverse benefit determination).
44. Id. at 133.
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1, which sets forth the “minimum requirements for employee benefit plan
procedures pertaining to claims for benefits by participants and
beneficiaries.” 45 If a claimant’s claim is ultimately denied in the internal
appeals process, § 2560.503-1(g) dictates that the claimant receive a final
adverse benefit determination, including, inter alia:
(iv) A description of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits
applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s
right to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following an
adverse benefit determination on review. 46

Generally, participants must exhaust the Plan-provided internal review
process before appealing to an external Independent Review Organization
and must exhaust the internal and external review processes set forth by
the Plan before bringing a civil action. 47 If, however, the Plan fails to
comply with the claims regulations, a claimant may be considered to have
exhausted the review process and file suit under ERISA § 502(a). 48
The circuit courts agree, and the Supreme Court confirms, that
ERISA itself does not contain a statute of limitations period for bringing
a civil action, and Plans may impose their own limitations period that will
govern as long as it is reasonable. 49 If a Plan fails to provide such a
limitations period, the federal courts may “borrow the most closely
analogous statute of limitations in the forum state.” 50 Typically, the
limitations period starts to run upon notice of the final denial, unless the
Plan Document states otherwise. 51 If the Plan fails to follow the ERISA
45. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a) (2018).
46. Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(iv) (2018).
47. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 22.
48. Id.; see generally Peter K. Stris & Victor O’Connell, ERISA & Equity, 29 ABA J. of Lab.
& Emp. L. (Fall Issue 1), 125-43 (2013). Participants may also bring a civil action under section
502(a) for benefits due under the plan, for recovery of benefits from a breaching fiduciary, and/or to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(1), (3) (LEXIS through Pub. L.
No. 115-140); see generally DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15.
49. See generally Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2015); Moyer v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2014); Santana-Díaz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 816 F.3d
172 (1st Cir. 2016); Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 496 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir.
2012), aff’d, S. Ct. 604 (2013); Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899
(9th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Heimeshoff
v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 610 (2013) (“Absent a controlling statute to the
contrary, a participant and a Plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one
that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.”).
50. Santaliz-Ríos v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2012).
51. “As a general matter, a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
‘accrues’—that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 610
(quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S.
192, 201 (1997)).
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claims procedures, a court may consider the claimant to have exhausted
the available reviews under the Plan, and thus the claimant is entitled to
bring suit. 52
The standard of review, in any case, determines the extent to which
the court may interpret the Plan Document and evaluate the fiduciaries’
decisions. Unless the Plan Document states that the more deferential
abuse of discretion standard of review applies, the court reviews cases
under the de novo standard, allowing the court to decide for itself “[w]hat
plan terms mean and how factual issues should be resolved.” 53 Even under
the abuse of discretion standard, the court considers the extent to which
the Plan decision-maker has a conflict of interest. 54
III. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF RIGHT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
As noted above, there is a consensus that a Plan can provide its own
limitations period and that courts can apply analogous state law
limitations when the Plan does not provide its own. However, there
remains disagreement as to whether of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv)
requires that the limitations period must also be provided in the final
benefits determination or need only be provided in the SPD. 55 If the statute
is violated, courts then consider whether the limitations period is equitably
tolled or whether the Plan effectively waived the limitations period. There
is also a split within the courts as to the effect of actual or constructive
notice on final benefits determination notice that does not provide the
Plan-provided limitations period. 56

52. Hancuch et al., supra note 32, at 10.
53. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
54. Id.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) (2018): A description of the plan’s review procedures
and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s right to
bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following an adverse benefit determination on
review.
56. Some courts that have held that a final determination notice that fails to provide the planprovided limitations period effectively waives the limitations period have declined to determine
whether the final determinations notice must list, in the absence of a plan-provided limitations period,
the limitations period that would apply (i.e. the statute of limitations provided by the most closely
analogous state law). See Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2015). While
the courts have frequently found state contract law or insurance law to be most closely analogous,
some parties to relevant litigation have suggested that this would place Plan Administrator in the
precarious position of researching the applicable laws from state to state and provide this legal advice
to the participants. The courts in both Mirza and Santana-Diaz decline to extend the time-limit notice
rule to plans that do not set a different time limit. Id.
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Three Circuit Courts Find Noncompliance to Eliminate PlanProvided Limitations Period

Three circuit courts have ruled that if a Plan fails to comply with
ERISA’s notice of contractual limitations period in a denial of benefits
notice, a participant may bring judicial review after the contractual
limitations period has run even if the claimant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the limitations period. Additionally, these three circuits
agree that, while strict compliance with § 2560.503-1 is not required, an
adverse determination notice must substantially comply with the statute.
Failure to include the Plan-provided limitations period does not
substantially comply with the requirements of § 2560.503-1. Remarkably,
none of these cases apply equitable tolling but instead act as if the Plan
did not provide a limitations period and borrow from the most analogous
state law.
1. Third Circuit: Mirza v. Insurance Administrator of America,
Inc.
In Mirza v. Insurance Administrator of America, Inc., the claimant
assigned her benefits to her two treating physicians’ offices, Dr. Neville
Mirza and Spine Orthopedic Sports (Spine), both of whom had the same
legal counsel, Callagy Law. 57 Mirza exhausted the internal review process
and received a final benefits determination notice on August 12, 2010,
which mentioned that she had the right to seek judicial review but failed
to mention that there was a Plan-provided limitations period. 58 On
November 23, 2010, a representative of Callagy Law spoke with the
insurance provider in relation to Spine’s claim. During this phone
conversation, the insurance provider claims to have stated that the oneyear limitations period ran from the date of the final denial.59 Callagy Law
then requested a copy of the Plan Document, still in relation to Spine’s
partial benefits denial, and received it on April 11, 2011, just four months
before Mirza’s limitations period expired. 60 The Plan Document provided
that claimants had a one-year limitations period to seek judicial review
after the final benefits determination notice was decided. 61 Mirza brought

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 130.
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suit, to which Spine was not a party, seeking review of the denied benefits
claim. 62
The district court found that Mirza was not entitled to equitable
tolling because Mirza had notice of the one-year limitations period,
imputing Callagy Law’s knowledge to Mirza because Callagy Law
represented the same claimant under the same Plan Document. 63 On
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(g)(1)(iv) requires Plan Administrators to inform claimants about the
time limitations period for bringing a civil action and that the remedy for
this notice failure is to “[s]et aside the plan’s time limit and apply the
limitations period from the most analogous state-law cause of action.” 64
Because the denial letter did not comply with this notice requirement, the
one-year deadline for judicial review set by the Plan was not
enforceable. 65 Thus, Mirza’s suit was timely as it was brought within the
six-year New Jersey limitations period for breach of contract.66
The Third Circuit reached this decision by interpreting 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to require the inclusion of the Plan-provided time
limit in an adverse benefit determination, careful to apply this provision
only to Plans that set a limitations period and not to Plans that are simply
silent and by default borrow from analogous state law. 67 The Third Circuit
also noted that allowing a Plan Administrator to argue that the claimant
had actual notice would encourage the Plan Administrators to “hide the
ball” by hiding the limitations period in the lengthy Plan Document and
not disclose it in the denial notice, as required by C.F.R. § 2560.5031(g)(1)(iv). 68
2. First Circuit: Santana-Diaz v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
In Santana-Diaz v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Santana-Diaz,
the claimant, went on long-term disability for “[m]ajor depression, high
blood pressure, asthma, and various other physical and mental
ailments.” 69 After almost a year and a half on long-term disability,
MetLife, the insurance provider, informed him that the Plan only allowed
for 24 months of long-term disability for mental disabilities like his
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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pursuant to the Plan, and that unless he could show documentation that he
was not subject to this limitation, further benefits would be denied.70 He
submitted further documentation but was denied an extension beyond the
24 months. 71 He appealed, but his claim was again denied. 72 When he had
first become an employee, his employer gave him a copy of the Plan
Document, which stated there was a three-year limitations period for
bringing suit. 73 Both denial notices said he could bring civil action but
failed to include the limitations period or mention that there was a
limitations period. 74
The district court dismissed his suit as time-barred. 75 On appeal, he
argued it should be equitably tolled as MetLife did not include a time
period for filing suit in its denial of benefits letter. 76 The First Circuit, like
in Mirza, did not reach the issue of equitable tolling and instead disposed
of the case on other grounds. 77 Because MetLife did not substantially
comply with § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), the appropriate remedy was to apply
the state’s most closely analogous limitations period, not the Plan’s
limitations period. 78
Unlike the Third Circuit in Mirza, the First Circuit in Santana-Diaz
required the plaintiff to show that the violation prejudiced him by showing
how proper notice “would have made a difference.” 79 Ultimately, the First
Circuit found that failure to include the required notice was per se
prejudicial to the claimant, and thus, the limitations period was altogether
inapplicable. 80 It reached its decision using the same logic as the Mirza
court, even quoting the decision. 81 To hold otherwise, the First Circuit
argued, would be against the purpose of ensuring a fair opportunity to
judicial review and would “‘[r]ender hollow the important disclosure
function of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv),’ as Plan Administrators would then

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 176.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 178.
78. Id. at 174 (“Because MetLife violated this regulatory obligation, the limitations period in
this case was rendered inapplicable.”).
79. Id. at 182 (citing Recupero v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 118 F. 3d 820, 840 (1st Cir.
1997)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 180.
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‘have no reason at all to comply with their obligation to include
contractual time limits for judicial review in benefit denial letters.’” 82
In discussing the policy behind its ruling, the First Circuit argued that
claimants are more likely to read the time limit if it is in the final denial
letter as opposed to being buried in the Plan Document given to the
claimant—possibly years earlier—which is why the DOL requires that
specific information be included in the denial letters. 83 The First Circuit
argued that Plan Administrators should not be able to avoid this inclusion
simply because the claimant had received the Plan Document at some
point. 84 To do so, the Santana-Diaz court reasoned, would “[e]ffectively
make § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) a ‘dead letter.’” 85
3. Sixth Circuit: Moyer v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
In Moyer v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., MetLife initially
approved Moyer’s claim but reversed the decision two years later once it
determined that “Moyer retained the physical capacity to perform work
somewhere other than his former job.” 86 As in Mirza and Santana-Diaz,
Moyer’s final benefits determination notice included notice of the right to
judicial review, but it failed to specify that the Plan had a three-year
contractual time limit. 87 The SPD, which was provided to Participants,
“[f]ailed to provide notice of either Moyer’s right to judicial review” or
the time limit. 88 Moyer’s Plan Document did state the time limit but, as
allowed by ERISA, it was not sent to Participants unless requested.89
Nevertheless, the district court found for MetLife, concluding that
“MetLife provided Moyer with constructive notice.” 90 Moyer appealed,
requesting that the court apply equitable tolling in allowing him to bring
his claim beyond the three-year contractual limitations period. 91 The Sixth
Circuit remanded the case and noted that “‘[a] notice that fails to
substantially comply with these [§ 1133] requirements does not trigger a
time bar contained within the plan.’” 92

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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Id. at 184 (citing Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Moyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503, 504 (6th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507 (citing Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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Unlike in Mirza and Santana-Diaz, one judge dissented with the
majority’s decision, reasoning that Moyer’s argument that the notice was
deficient did not specifically mention 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, and thus
the court should not address it. 93 The majority disagreed, finding that
raising the broad issue of notice was enough for the court to evaluate the
notice requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. 94 The dissent further
argued that even if it was permitted to review 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, the
exclusion still constituted substantial compliance with the statute, and thus
the Plan’s limitations period should apply. 95 As the dissenting opinion
points out, “courts elsewhere split on whether the regulation requires a
claim-denial letter to inform a participant of both their right to bring a
civil action and the action’s limitations period.” 96
4. Sixth Circuit: Engleson v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America
Though not part of the circuit split, Engleson v. Unum Life Insurance
Co. of America provides important insights into the Sixth Circuit’s
decisions and perfectly summarizes the change in claims procedure notice
requirements that took effect January 1, 2002. 97 Claimant Engleson’s final
denial notice did not include the limitations notices required by the Plan,
and he brought his claim after the contractual limitations period. 98 The
Sixth Circuit found for the insurance company, stating:
Engleson suffers from unfortunate timing . . . . Had these events
transpired a year later, he would have a colorable ERISA violation.
But the civil action notice was not required until 2002, having been
enacted in 2000. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(o) (2001) (indicating that
the regulations would take effect on January 1, 2002). Compare 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(4) (2000) (requiring “[a]ppropriate information
as to the steps to be taken if the participant . . . wishes to submit his . . .
claim for review”), with 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv)
(2001) (requiring plans to include “a description of the plan’s review
procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including
a statement of the claimant’s right to bring a civil action” to challenge
adverse benefit determinations). . . . We conclude that Unum was under
no regulatory obligation in 2001 to disclose either Engleson’s right to
pursue litigation in federal court or the limited window for obtaining

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 508 (Cook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 509 (Cook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508.
See generally Engleson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 723 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id.
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such review in its claim denial letter. 99

The court previously referenced the 2000 edition of the Code of Federal
Regulations:
(f) Content of notice. A plan administrator . . . shall provide to every
claimant who is denied a claim for benefits written notice setting forth
in a manner calculated to be understood by the claimant:
....
(4) Appropriate information as to the steps to be taken if the participant
or beneficiary wishes to submit his or her claim for review. 100

The law had changed by the time Engleson brought his claim, but the
court applied the law as it was when his claim accrued 101 and held to the
contrary of what it would later hold in Moyer. 102 The Sixth Circuit
reviewed Engleson’s claim 103 and ultimately declined to apply equitable
tolling or set aside the Plan’s limitations period. 104
B.

Circuit Courts Finding Actual Notice Meets ERISA Notice
Requirements

Three other circuit court cases have found that exclusion of the
Plan’s contractual limitations period is not enough to trigger equitable
tolling. Each court held either that notice of a Plan’s contractual
limitations period is not required to be disclosed in a denial notice, or have
refused to apply equitable tolling because Participants had actual notice
of the limitations period from a separate notice.
1. Eleventh Circuit: Wilson v. Standard Insurance Co.
In Wilson v. Standard Insurance Co., the claimant, Wilson, appealed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the insurance company
on the basis that her claim was time-barred by the contractual limitations

99. Id. at 618-19.
100. Id. at 617 (citing the 2000 Code of Federal Regulations).
101. Id. at 613.
102. Id. at 624; see Moyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503, 504 (6th Cir. 2014).
103. The court applied a five-part equitable tolling test to render its decision: “‘(1) lack of actual
notice of filing requirement; (2) lack of constructive knowledge of filing requirement; (3) diligence
in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) a plaintiff’s reasonableness
in remaining ignorant of the notice requirement.’” Id. at 623 (citing Longazel v. Fort Dearborn Life
Ins. Co., 363 F. App’x 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2010)).
104. Engleson, 723 F.3d at 611.
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period provided by the Plan Document. 105 Wilson was denied long-term
disability benefits, appealed, and exhausted the internal review process
resulting in a final benefits determination notice. 106 The notice failed to
note the contractual limitations period provided by Wilson’s Plan. 107 She
filed 34 months after the three-year limitations period given by the
policy. 108 In her appeal, Wilson pled that the limitations period be
equitably tolled. 109
Though the Supreme Court previously ruled on a similar issue in
Heimeshoff (2013), 110 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the issue was
not resolved in that “Heimeshoff left open the possibility that equitable
tolling ‘may apply,’ but only ‘[t]o the extent the participant has diligently
pursued both internal review and judicial review but was prevented from
filing suit by extraordinary circumstances.’” 111 Wilson argued that the
court should not have even considered whether she was diligent in
pursuing a claim because the Plan’s noncompliance with §2560.5031(g)(1)(iv) did not afford her the full and fair review to which she was
entitled under 29 U.S.C. § 1133. 112 The Eleventh Circuit finally concluded
that the full and fair review requirement of § 1133 applied only to the
review by the appropriate named fiduciary. 113
Unlike the courts in Moyer, Mirza, and Santana-Diaz, the Eleventh
Circuit found 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to be “anything but
clear.” 114 The Eleventh Circuit went on to find that even if it construed the
statute in Wilson’s favor, it would not fault the insurance company for
interpreting it differently. 115 Thus, Wilson was required to show
extraordinary circumstances and diligence in pursuing her claim.
Although the insurance company’s denial notice excluded the time period
for appeal, it “did alert Wilson that it would provide ‘copies of all
documents, records and other information relevant to [her long-term
disability] claim free of charge.’” 116 The Eleventh Circuit found that this
was sufficient notice to prompt Wilson to investigate the claims process,
105. Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841, 842 (11th Cir. 2015).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013). Discussed infra
Section III(C).
111. Wilson, 613 F. App’x at 843 (citing Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. 604).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 844.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 845.
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and that Wilson did not exercise even “minimal diligence in discovering
the terms of the policy.” 117
2. Ninth Circuit: Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability
Plan
In Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, the claimant,
Scharff, received a final denial notice directing her to review the
procedures in the SPD, which mentioned the one-year limitations period
and had been provided to her upon hire. 118 The final denial notice told her
of her right to file suit in federal court but did not expressly mention that
time limit. 119 Scharff brought suit after her short-term disability claim was
denied—20 days after the one-year limitations period set by the Plan. 120
The district court dismissed the case as untimely. 121
On appeal, Scharff fatally conceded “that the Plan met all applicable
ERISA disclosure requirements and that MetLife was not obligated under
ERISA to inform her of the deadline.” 122 She chose instead to ask the court
to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine. 123 The Ninth Circuit
assumed—without affirmatively deciding—that the reasonable
expectations doctrine applied, with the deciding factor being “whether the
deadline was ‘written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant.’” 124 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the time
limit was not buried in the document, was easily accessible, and met the
notice requirements. 125
In the alternative, Scharff asked the court to incorporate the
California Code of Regulations requiring insurers to disclose any time
limits that may apply to the claim, but the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt
such requirements into federal common law and affirmed the dismissal. 126
Unlike the previous cases reviewed in this Article, Scharff did not discuss
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) and its ambiguity. 127 Instead, it

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

Id. at 845-46.
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Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 903 (citing 29 U.S.C.S. § 1022(a)) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
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Id. at 907.
Id. at 902.
See id.
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implicitly assumed the time limit disclosure requirements could be met by
disclosure in the SPD. 128
3. Second Circuit: Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident
Insurance Co.
In Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
Heimeshoff filed for long-term disability benefits under her employer’s
group health plan but her claim was denied. 129 She obtained counsel but
was informed by Hartford “‘[t]hat no formal appeal was necessary and
that if Hartford received clarification of Heimeshoff’s functionality, the
insurance company would re-open the claim.’” 130 The Plan set the
limitations period for taking legal action at three years from the “‘[t]ime
written proof of loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of
the policy.’” 131 The district court concluded that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(g)(1)(iv) unambiguously does not require a statement of the time limits
applicable to bring a civil action; it dismissed her claim as time barred,
concluding Heimeshoff filed her claim two months too late. 132
On appeal, Heimeshoff argued that the Plan’s “[l]imitations period
did not begin to run until the final denial of benefits.” 133 The Second
Circuit disagreed. 134 Heimeshoff also reasserted her argument that
Hartford was required by 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to disclose the
time limit for bringing a civil action and pled that “[f]ailure to do so
entitled [her] to equitable tolling.” 135 The Second Circuit decided it need
not address that issue because Heimeshoff’s counsel conceded that before
the limitations period expired he had received a copy of the Plan
Document containing the limitations period. 136

128. Id. at 906.
129. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 3:10cv1813 (JBA), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6882, at *1, 4-2 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2012), aff’d, 496 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134
S. Ct. 604 (2013).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *7.
132. Id. at *13-16.
133. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 496 F. App’x 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2012),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
134. Id. (“Here, Connecticut’s six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions
applies, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-576, while federal law controls the accrual date of the party’s claim. . .
. Under Connecticut law, parties to an insurance contract may shorten the statute of limitations period
to not less than one yearFalse In this Circuit, a statute of limitations specified by an ERISA plan for
bringing a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 may begin to run before a claimant can bring a legal action.”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Relevant United States Supreme Court Decisions

Heimeshoff appealed to the Supreme Court, which “[g]ranted
certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the
enforceability of this common contractual limitations provision.” 137 The
Court addressed whether the Plan’s contractual limitations provisions
were enforceable. 138 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Second
Circuit’s decision holding that the Plan’s limitations provision was
enforceable. 139 While the Supreme Court did not discuss what action is
appropriate when a Plan fails to comply with ERISA’s notice requirement
of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), the Court’s decision offers other relevant
insight into the ERISA claims process and the policy supporting the
statutory requirements.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INTERPRETING 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-2(G)(1)(IV) TO MANDATE NOTICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AVAILABILITY IN THE DETERMINATION NOTICE
The uniformity of decisions is crucial for Plan Administrators;
without clear direction, Plan Administrators and fiduciaries may be held
liable for noncompliance. 140 This is especially important for multistate
employers who may be subject to different common law rules from
different circuits in which they operate. 141 Moreover, “‘Congress expects
uniformity of decisions under ERISA.’” 142 The circuit split on the
interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) is directly contrary to
this directive. The Supreme Court decision in Heimeshoff (2013) leaves
ambiguity as to the interpretation of the statute; four of the six circuit split
decisions discussed above took place after the Court’s ruling in
Heimeshoff (2013). 143
137. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604, 610 (2013). “We granted
certiorari to resolve a split as between. . . . Burke [v. PriceWaterHouseCoopers LLP Long Term
Disability Plan, 572 F. 3d 76, 79-81 (CA2 2009)] (plan provision requiring suit within three years
after proof-of-loss deadline is enforceable); and Rice v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Insurance Co., 578
F.3d 450, 455-456 (CA6 2009) (same), with White v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 488 F.3d
240, 245-248 (CA4 2007) (not enforceable); and Price v. Provident Life & Acc. Insurance Co., 2 F.3d
986, 988 (CA9 1993) (same).” Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 610.
138. Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 608.
139. Id. at 605.
140. Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2009).
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
143. Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2015); Santana-Díaz v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 816 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2016); Moyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.
2014); Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2015).
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Interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv)

There is very little legislative or regulatory guidance on the
interpretation of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv). The PPACA added new
requirements in the IFR, effective September 21, 2010, which were in
effect for all the cases discussed above, except Scharff. 144 The IFR of 29
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(E) have since been adopted into the
final regulations, effective January 1, 2017. 145 Neither the interim rules
nor the final rules clarify the requirements of § 2560.503-1(g), but they
reiterate that notice requirements must be complied with: “A plan and
issuer must provide notice to individuals, in a culturally and linguistically
appropriate manner . . . that complies with the requirements of 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(g) and (j).” 146
The final rules go on to list additional requirements, including that
“[t]he plan and issuer must provide a description of available internal
appeals and external review processes, including information regarding
how to initiate an appeal.” 147 Adding such requirements emphasizes the
importance of making the internal and external review procedures
available to a claimant who has been denied benefits. Even if it is not
expressly required, the initiation of an appeal necessarily includes the time
limit for bringing the appeal. Logically, the process would entail detailing
who, when, where, and how. Without all these parts, the claimant would
be making decisions without knowing all the pertinent details. For firsttime claimants, the process is unfamiliar with few resources known to
them. It is confusing and riddled with unfamiliar medical terminology and
codes. Claimants are likely to be overwhelmed and emotional as these
decisions directly impact their health, wellbeing, and often income. In
some circumstances, the outcome of the appeals decision can foreseeably
affect them the rest of their lives.

144. See generally Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers
Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 43330 (proposed July 23, 2010) (codified
at 26 C.F.R. 54, 26 C.F.R. 602, 29 C.F.R. 2590, 45 C.F.R. 147), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2010-07-23/pdf/2010-18043.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PUU-Z3PA] (last accessed Feb. 25, 2017).
145. Internal claims and appeals and external review processes, 29 C.F.R. § 25902719(b)(2)(ii)(E).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 2590-2719(b)(2)(ii)(E)(4).
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1. Courts’ Interpretations Favoring the Inclusion of the
Limitations Period Disclosure
Without further statutory or regulatory guidance, courts are left to
their own interpretations, creating disunity. Consider again the language
of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv):
The notification shall set forth, in a manner calculated to be understood
by the claimant . . . (iv) A description of the plan’s review procedures
and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement
of the claimant’s right to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the
Act following an adverse benefit determination on review. 148

In Mirza, the parties disagreed as to the interpretation of 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv). Mirza argued that, “[a] claimant’s ‘right to bring a
civil action’ . . . is one of the ‘review procedures’ for which ‘time limits’
must be disclosed.” 149 The insurance company argued that the statute
requires two distinct requirements, dividing the sentence at the comma
into: “[n]otice of the plan’s review procedures and applicable time limits
for those procedures” and “‘[n]otice of the right to sue.” 150 To come to
this conclusion, the word “including” must be ignored or lose its meaning.
However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[i]t is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole,
to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” 151 If a statute can be
interpreted so as to avoid surplusage, it should. 152 Furthermore,
punctuation alone is rarely sufficient to sustain or contradict an
interpretation. 153 In light of these rules of statutory interpretation, the
meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) is clear: notice of the Plan’s
review procedures necessarily includes notices of the application
limitations period.
The Mirza court disagrees with the insurance company, finding that
“including” is the most important word and that it modifies the word
“description”: “If the description of the review procedures must
‘includ[e]’ a statement concerning civil action, then civil actions are

148. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv).
149. Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2015).
150. Id.
151. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001)).
152. See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY
STATE 282 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2013).
153. Id. at 271.
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logically one of the review procedures envisioned by the Department of
Labor. And as with any other review procedure, the administrator must
disclose the plan’s applicable time limits.”154 The court went on to argue
that a broad interpretation is preferred because ERISA is a remedial
statute. 155 This interpretation is more consistent with modern principles of
statutory interpretation. 156
In Santana-Diaz, the First Circuit, like the Third Circuit Court in
Mirza, finds the word “including” in 29 § C.F.R. 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to
be pivotal, and ultimately decided, like the Third Circuit, that the meaning
is clear: the statute requires the time limit for filing suit to be provided for
both the Plan’s review procedures and for judicial review. 157 In discussing
the policy behind their ruling, the First Circuit cites Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 158 which found ERISA to be a remedial statute intended “[t]o
‘protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for
employee benefit plans and to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts.’” 159 Failing to provide
notice of an applicable limitations period, however, protects the interests
of the employer.
Furthermore, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 provides that claimants whose claims
have been denied benefits should be “afford[ed] a reasonable
opportunity . . . for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary.” 160 The First Circuit held the purpose of this is to “enable the
claimant to prepare adequately for any further administrative review, as
well as appeal to the federal courts.” 161
2. Courts’ Interpretations Not Requiring the Limitations Period
Disclosure
In Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to
“[c]learly require that a claims denial letter include notice about the
administrative review procedures and the time limits for filing that apply
to those procedures as well as the fact that the claimant has a right to bring
154. Mirza, 800 F.3d at 134.
155. Id. at 135.
156. See BRESSMAN ET. AL, supra note 152, at 270-83.
157. Santana-Díaz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 816 F.3d 172, 179-80 (1st Cir. 2016).
158. Id. at 179.
159. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 546 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (citing 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b)
(LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140)) (alteration in original).
160. Claims Procedure, 29 U.S.C.S. §1133(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
161. Santana-Díaz, 816 F.3d at 179 (citing Witt v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.3d 1269, 1280
(11th Cir. 2014)).
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a civil action under § 502(a) of ERISA.” 162 The Eleventh Circuit goes on
to say that interpreting a lawsuit as part of the Plan’s review process is a
“strained reading.” 163
Perhaps supporting this interpretation is the fact that the template for
final benefit determination notices, published by EBSA, does not
expressly include a disclosure of the limitations period.164 The model
document contains a provision stating:
If we have upheld the denial, there is no further review available under
the appeals process. However, you may have other remedies available
under State or Federal law, such as filing a lawsuit. Other resources to
help you: For questions about your appeal rights, this notice, or for
assistance, you can contact [if coverage is group health plan coverage,
insert: the Employee Benefits Security Administration at 1-866-444EBSA (3272)] [and/or] [if coverage is insured, insert State Department
of Insurance contact information]. 165

While this language does provide boilerplate language for the notice, it is
not sufficient on its own. The Plan Administrator must fill out most of the
notice with the claimant’s particular appeal facts, and Plan provisions
presumably include the time-period set forth by the Plan. In any case,
statutory language is authoritative and binding; sample language from
EBSA is not. The Plan Administrator must be familiar with the applicable
laws and apply them appropriately. 166
The Eleventh Circuit failed to consider that the Plan can set the time
limit for bringing a lawsuit. While the suit would not be part of the Plan’s
review process, in that the review is done by an external reviewer, the Plan
still exercises control over the time limit for bringing suit, making it part
of the review process.
B.

Strict versus Substantial Compliance

Assuming that § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) requires the Plan’s limitations
period to be disclosed in the final benefits determination notice, the circuit
courts disagree as to whether its exclusion would still render the notice

162. Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841, 843 (11th Cir. 2015).
163. Id. at 844.
OF
LAB.,
137,
145-49,
164. Appendix
C:
Model
Notices,
DEP’T
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resourcecenter/publications/compliance-assistance-guide-appendix-c.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FCG-RU73] (last
updated July 3, 2014).
165. Id. at 148.
166. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1004.
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within substantial compliance of the statute. Both the interim rules and the
final rules require strict compliance with the statute, except that:
de minimis violations that do not cause, and are not likely to cause,
prejudice or harm to the claimant so long as the plan or issuer
demonstrates that the violation was for good cause or due to matters
beyond the control of the plan or issuer and that the violation occurred
in the context of an ongoing, good faith exchange of information
between the plan and the claimant. This exception is not available if the
violation is part of a pattern or practice of violations by the plan or
issuer. 167

Thus, the question becomes: is the exclusion of the Plan-set limitations
period prejudicial to or likely to be prejudicial to the claimant? A claimant
who is in the unfortunate position of appealing after the limitations period
has expired has certainly incurred harm, in the form of the costs involved
in the appeals process, as well as the potential for having lost all
opportunity for appeal.
If, then, the exclusion causes harm or prejudice to the claimant, did
the Plan do so for good cause or for reasons beyond its control? Note
especially that the requirement is not for good faith but for good cause. 168
A Plan might have a good faith belief that the final determination notice
need not include the limitations period. This will not suffice. What is
required is a good reason, possibly outside of the control of the Plan, to
deviate from the required disclosures. 169 Finally, this reason must have
been in the context of “[a]n ongoing, good faith exchange of
information.” 170 Only in the exchange of information is the good faith
standard applied, and it requires that the Plan not withhold pertinent
information from the claimant. The limitations period set in the Plan is
pertinent information to the claimant’s appeal.
If the Plan is not in strict compliance with the statute and does not
meet the exception, the remedy is to deem the Plan’s review process
exhausted and allow the claimant to pursue remedies under § 502(a) of
ERISA or in state court. 171 Unfortunately, in a situation where the
claimant is not provided notice of the time limitations for bringing suit,
this remedy puts the cart before the horse. A claimant in this situation has

167.
(2018).
168.
169.
170.
171.

Internal claims and appeals and external review processes, 29 C.F.R. § 2590-2719(F)(2)
DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 1007.
Id. at 931.
29 C.F.R. § 2590-2719(F)(2).
Id. § 2590-2719(F)(1).
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already been barred from bringing suit because the limitations period has
run. The decisions in Moyer and Santana-Diaz remedy this issue.
The Moyer court found that failure to comply with the limitations
disclosure requirements of the statute would not be found “substantial”
under a substantial compliance test. 172 The dissent proposed a different
substantial compliance test method that bypasses the requirements in 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), instead looking to the greater purpose of
29 U.S.C. § 1133 as a whole:
Under our test, “[i]f the communications between the administrator and
participant as a whole fulfill the twin purposes of § 1133, the
administrator’s decision will be upheld even where the particular
communication does not meet those requirements.” The “twin purposes”
of § 1133 are “(1) to notify the claimant of the specific reasons for a
claim denial, and (2) to provide the claimant an opportunity to have that
decision reviewed by the fiduciary.” 173

In evaluating the substantial compliance analysis, the Sixth Circuit
considered the purpose of the statute, namely, “that the claimant be
notified of the reasons for the denial of the claim and have a fair
opportunity for review.” 174 The dissent argued that this review is only
assured as it relates to the Plan fiduciary, citing the “twin purposes” of §
1133 cited in Wenner v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada. 175 The
majority in Moyer limits Wenner to its facts: “The adverse benefit
determination letter failed to provide the plaintiff information on his right
to have the benefit decision reviewed by the named fiduciary. It does not
discount the statutory and regulatory language that applies to judicial
review.” 176 Certainly the rule-makers did not write the requirements in 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) and emphasize them again with the
inclusion of 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(E) for them to be set
aside, even under the guise of looking to the greater purpose of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1133 as a whole.
In a Benefits Claims Procedure Regulations FAQs publication, the
DOL has addressed the issue of substantial compliance with the
application of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 requirements and suggests a
remedy that would correct the harm caused by the noncompliance. First,
172. Moyer v. Metropo. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2014).
173. Id. at 509 (Cook, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wenner v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada, 482 F.3d 878, 882 (6th Cir. 2007).
174. Id. at 506 (majority opinion) (quoting Kent v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 803,
807 (6th Cir. 1996)).
175. Id.; Wenner v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 482 F.3d 878, 882 (6th Cir. 2007).
176. Moyer. 762 F.3d. at 506.
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the FAQs emphasize that the claimant still bears the burden of proving
that the Plan failed to follow or establish claims procedures that comply
with the regulations.177 The DOL also acknowledged that the Plan has
significant discretion in establishing and following procedures:
For example, paragraph (b)(3) of the regulation prohibits a plan from
establishing or administering its procedures so as to unduly inhibit or
hamper the initiation or processing of claims for benefits. Accordingly,
a plan will be accorded significant deference in evaluating whether it
failed to follow a procedure consistent with those aspects of the
regulation. 178

The DOL also noted that “not every deviation by a plan from the
requirements of the regulation justifies proceeding directly to court.” 179
Inadvertent deviances from the Plan’s established procedures, for
example, do not trigger the 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)
“deemed exhausted” clause. 180 Instead, “if the plan’s procedures provide
an opportunity to effectively remedy the inadvertent deviation without
prejudice to the claimant, through the internal appeal process or otherwise,
then there ordinarily will not have been a failure to establish or follow
reasonable procedures as contemplated by 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(l).” 181
The FAQs give an example of an adverse benefit determination that,
though otherwise compliant, inadvertently fails to include the specific
Plan provision on which the denial was based, suggesting that this may be
corrected by disclosing the missing information. 182 Such forgiveness is
acceptable only when the Plan sufficiently provides access to a reasonable
and compliant claims procedure. 183 This makes sense; failing to provide a
specific Plan provision may inconvenience a claimant who wishes to file
a claim but does not have the critical information regarding how to file a
claim.
The FAQs continue on, explaining that consistent deviations from
Plan procedures or “[d]eviations not susceptible to meaningful correction
177. Benefit Claims Procedure Regulation FAQs, F-2: What principles are likely to be applied
when a claimant elects to abandon the plan’s administrative claims process in favor of pursuing his
or her benefit claim in court?, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/benefit-claimsprocedure-regulation [http://perma.cc/JKX5-LMZD] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (stating that forgiveness for non-compliance is only acceptable when “the plan will have
provided access to a reasonable claims procedure consistent with the regulations”).
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through plan procedures” justifies the conclusion that the plan does not
provide reasonable procedures. 184 The FAQs then expressly exclude such
remedies in certain situations, “[s]uch as the failure to include a
description of the plan’s review procedures in a notice of an adverse
benefit determination.” 185 This suggests that leaving out the time-limit of
the Plan’s review procedures is not easily remedied. Indeed, the timeperiod is a necessary part of the Plan’s review procedures. A claimant
unfamiliar with a claims appeal is not likely to be aware of the existence
of a time limitation without being expressly told. It would not be
“susceptible to meaningful correction through plan procedures” 186 unless
the Plan itself directly extended the limitations period. This, however, is
unlikely to happen, even aside from the Plan Administrator’s potential
bias toward the employer, simply because of the inherent problems with
the inconsistencies of applying Plan procedures differently to diverse
Participants. Such inconsistencies can lead to additional liabilities for the
employer. 187
C.

Actual Notice and Constructive Knowledge

If the FAQ deviation forgiveness is applied to the omission of the
Plan’s limitations period, the issue could be resolved if the claimant gains
actual knowledge of the Plan’s limitations period. Indeed, some courts
have held that knowledge of the limitations period prevents claimants
from arguing the limitations period should be waived or tolled if the
limitations period is not included in the adverse benefits determination. 188
The Ninth Circuit argued that ERISA’s central policy goal,
protecting participants “by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information . . . and
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
[f]ederal courts,” is satisfied by the distribution of the SPD. 189
Additionally, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(m)(4)(s) requires the disclosure of
applicable time limits for claims benefits.190 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding
employer’s inconsistent application of plan provisions contributed to the determination that a denial
of benefits was arbitrary and capricious).
188. See supra note 8.
189. Congressional findings and declaration of policy, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b) (LEXIS through
Pub L. No. 115-140); Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899, 904 (9th
Cir. 2009).
190. Contents of summary plan description, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(m)(4)(s).
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imputed the claimant with constructive knowledge of the limitations
period because that information was in the SPD that she received prior to
her claim, even if the notice was not provided in the determination
notice. 191
The Ninth Circuit, also cites cases in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts finding that: “[p]lan participants who have been
provided with an SPD are charged with constructive knowledge of the
contents of the document.” 192 All four of these cases, however, were
decided and cited prior to the change in disclosure requirements of 2002,
as discussed above in Engleson. Ironically, the Scharff court cited the need
for uniformity amongst the circuit courts as the reason for finding receipt
of the SPD equates to constructive knowledge. 193
In Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit held that “there is no equitable tolling
when ‘the plaintiffs had notice sufficient to prompt them to investigate
and . . . had they done so diligently, they would have discovered the basis
for their claims.’” 194 Presumably, when the Eleventh Circuit uses the word
“investigate,” it refers to the expectation that a claimant will request and
read the applicable SPD. It is unfair, however, to punish claimants who
may not know to request the appropriate documentation and apply it to
their claims, while the Plan Administrator knows the applicable
limitations period and fails to disclose it as required in the regulation.
Importantly, there are significant differences between the SPD and
an adverse benefits determination notice. First, the SPD may be received
years before the initial claim is even brought. Second, the SPD is often a
lengthy document, easily 50 or more pages, while a benefits determination
is only several pages. 195 Third, the benefits determination contains only
information relevant to the particular benefit claim, while the SPD
summarizes the entirety of the Plan Document. 196 Thus, the claimant may
not have actual notice of the limitations period at all, despite receipt of the
SPD. This hardly furthers ERISA’s goal of fairness to the participant. The
need to punish non-compliant Plan Administrators must be balanced
against the need to prevent participants from taking advantage of the noncompliance despite clear (actual) knowledge of the statute of limitations
period.
191. Scharff, 581 F.3d at 908.
192. Id. (“The Fifth and Eighth Circuits specifically declined to require plan administrators to
inform participants separately of provisions already contained in the SPD.”).
193. Id.
194. Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841, 845 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pac. Harbor
Capital, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 252 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001)).
195. See DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 164, at 143-44.
196. See id.
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Equitable Tolling

Claimants in Mirza, Santana-Diaz, Moyer, Wilson, and Heimeshoff
all pled for equitable tolling. 197 Even prior to the expanded review process
rules, courts have long held that inadequate notice to claimants will toll
the running of the appeals period. 198 However, the circuit courts were
divided on the application of equitable tolling, even after the Supreme
Court ruled in Heimeshoff (2013). The Supreme Court found that a Plan’s
limitations provision must be enforced as written unless it determines
either that the period is unreasonably short, or that a controlling statute
prevents the limitations provision from taking effect. 199 The Supreme
Court noted that “[t]his focus on the written terms of the plan is the
linchpin of ‘a system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs, or
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA]
plans in the first place.’” 200
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson
applied equitable tolling to Wilson’s claim but held that she did not meet
the extraordinary circumstances and exercise of diligence required for
equitable tolling. 201 In Wilson, the claimant brought suit 34 months after
the Plan’s three-year limitations period ran out. 202 In its holding, the
Eleventh Circuit cited the policy behind the Supreme Court ruling in
Heimeshoff (2013): “The principle that contractual limitations provisions
ordinarily should be enforced as written is especially appropriate when
enforcing an ERISA plan. The plan, in short, is at the center of ERISA.” 203
The Eleventh Circuit views the claimants only other option as equitable
tolling, which this court calls “a form of extraordinary relief that courts
have extended only sparingly” 204 and requires a showing of
“extraordinary circumstances and diligence in pursuing her rights.” 205
Also, after the Supreme Court’s decision, Mirza and Santana-Diaz
held that equitable tolling does not apply because of the noncompliance

197. See generally Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of Am., Inc., 800 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2015); SantanaDíaz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 816 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2016); Moyer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d
503 (6th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Standard Ins. Co., 613 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2015); Heimeshoff v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013).
198. DEIRDRE C. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 15, at 935.
199. Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 612.
200. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).
201. Wilson, 613 F. App’x at 845-46.
202. Id. at 845.
203. Id. at 844 (quoting Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 611-12).
204. Id. (citing Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190,
1197 (11th Cir. 2008)).
205. Id.
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with the disclosure of the Plan’s limitation periods.206 Thus, the claimants
were not required to show extraordinary circumstances and diligence in
pursuing their rights, as the Supreme Court held. 207 Instead of tolling the
limitations period, the courts simply disregarded the Plan’s limitations
period, as if the Plan had waived the courts’ right to determine it by failing
to disclose it, and instead treated the claim as if the Plan did not provide a
limitations period. 208 Since ERISA itself does not provide a limitations
period for bringing claims, these two courts followed the most closely
analogous state law cause of action limitations period, usually contract
law. 209
E.

Policy Reasons
In Mirza, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court, arguing:
If we allowed plan administrators in these circumstances to respond to
untimely suits by arguing that claimants were either on notice of the
contractual deadline or otherwise failed to exercise reasonable diligence,
plan administrators would have no reason at all to comply with their
obligation to include contractual time limits for judicial review in benefit
denial letters. 210

The Third Circuit agrees that the notices’ deficiencies effectively
triggered equitable tolling and, for policy reasons, found that it would be
better to set aside the Plan’s limitations period and instead apply the most
closely analogous state law. The court’s policy argument is that:
[t]he Department of Labor obviously thought it important to make sure
claimants were aware of these substantially reduced limitations periods.
One very simple solution, which imposes a trivial burden on plan
administrators, is to require them to inform claimants of deadlines for

206. Mirza v. Ins. Adm’rs of America, Inc., 800 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We do not find
equitable tolling to be an obstacle, or even relevant, to Mirza’s claim. Instead, we focus our analysis
on . . . whether Defendants violated their regulatory obligations by failing to include the plan-imposed
one-year time limit for seeking judicial review in the letter denying Mirza’s request for benefits. We
do so because that issue—and not equitable tolling—controls.”); Santana-Díaz v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 816 F.3d 172, 183 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Our review today, however, does not reach the equitable
tolling question because we conclude that MetLife’s failure to include the time limit in the final denial
letter rendered, as a matter of law, the contractual three-year limitations period altogether
inapplicable.”).
207. Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 615 (2013) (“[T]o the
extent the participant has diligently pursued both internal review and judicial review but was
prevented from filing suit by extraordinary circumstances, equitable tolling may apply.”).
208. Mirza, 800 F.3d at 133; Santana-Díaz, 816 F.3d at 185.
209. Mirza, 800 F.3d at 133; Santana-Díaz, 816 F.3d at 185.
210. Mirza, 800 F.3d at 133.
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judicial review in the documents claimants are most likely to read—
adverse benefit determinations. Section 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) does just
that. 211

Otherwise, “plan administrators could easily hide the ball and obstruct
access to the courts.” 212
Furthermore, there is very little burden on the Plan Administrator,
and great benefit to the claimant, to simply add a sentence to an adverse
determination notice setting forth the time limit. The Plan Administrator,
as the creator and administrator of the rules, is in a better position to know
about this information. Indeed, the Plan sets forth the rules that the
claimant is contractually obligated to follow with no input from the
claimant. The Plan Administrator, however, is responsible for the
administration of the Plan, including the internal review process. As such,
it benefits the Plan if the claimant misses the limitations period.
V. CONCLUSION: ERISA’S NOTICE REQUIREMENT REQUIRES
DISCLOSURE OF PLAN PROVIDED LIMITATIONS PERIOD
Without reading superfluous words into the language of 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), the meaning of the text is clear: the Plan-provided
limitations period must be included in a final adverse benefits
determination notice. 213 This is consistent with the intent of ERISA 214 and
confirmed by the additional requirements of the PPACA. 215 Furthermore,
imputing the claimant with knowledge of the limitations period based
upon receipt of the SPD is unfair to the claimant, and enables Plan
Administrators to bury pertinent information in massive, esoteric Plan
Documents or lengthy, forgotten SPDs. The inclusion of such language is
a minimal burden to Plan Administrators, who readily have the
information available and know of its existence, relevance, and
importance.
To avoid the equitable tolling requirement of showing either the
claimants exercised diligence in pursuing their claims, or their
extraordinary circumstances preventing them from doing so, in situations
of noncompliance the court should set aside the Plan’s limitations period
and apply the limitations period of the most closely analogous state cause
of action’s limitations period. This is a fair solution: the claimant has
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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actual knowledge of the limitations-period 216 and the employer is
penalized for, at best, not complying with the statutory requirements or,
at worst, intentionally hiding relevant information from a claimant.
Furthermore, the limitations period is not indefinite and is based on a
reasonably similar standard. 217 Barring claimants from bringing claims
after the Plan’s contractual limitations period have run, when the
claimants were not provided the statutorily-required notice, discourages
Plans’ compliance with ERISA. 218
For the foregoing reasons, the First, Third, and Sixth Circuit Courts’
interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1) is most consistent with the
purpose of ERISA and text of the statute. These three circuit courts’
decisions to apply the limitations period from the most closely analogous
state law claim when notice is inadequate is the fairest solution and
encourages Plans to comply with the requirements of ERISA.
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